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Abstract
Most analyses of policy interdependence operate under the assumption that international
policy networks can be observed by focusing on the diffusion of one policy across countries.
Consequently, if a focal policy is not adopted from one country to the next, researchers
usually claim that interdependence is weak and diffusion may have not occurred. In this
article we take issue with this argument and challenge the notion that diffusion processes
and interdependence entail the same policy diffusing. We posit that national governments,
which are usually confronted by a bundle of diffusing policies instead of one unique policy,
are often pressed to implement the policy adopted in neighboring countries. At the same
time, the decision makers’ incentive to implement this instrument may rely on whether the
domestic government is more or less dependent on foreign resources and, thus, the policy
preferences of foreign constituents. We hold that, conditional on a neighbor’s pressure
to adopt a policy, choosing an alternative policy is more likely to occur in countries that
are relatively less dependent on economic flows, where governments have more political
leeway to model policy diffusion into their strategic advantage. We trace this alteration
mechanism using two studies of environmental policy diffusion across space and time.
Our analyses suggest that considering only one diffusing policy although alternatives are
implemented risks underestimating policy interdependence, as well as biasing inference
on the scope of policy diffusion.
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In a context of global interdependence, public policymaking is a challenging task. Gov-
ernment officials are forced to carefully weigh policy options in order to understand how an
instrument may produce domestic winners and losers, especially in a democratic context in
which electoral success depends on policy choices (Rodrik, 1997; Iversen and Cusak, 2000).
Simultaneously, decision makers are sensitive to other countries’ choices and need to consider
policies implemented in the international networks their country belongs to (Simmons et al.,
2006; Shipan and Volden, 2008).
A government can reject the adoption of an internationally diffusing policy because of
domestic concerns. However, rejecting a policy instrument is not equivalent to rejecting the
policy’s objective altogether, especially when countries are faced with an externality that needs
to be addressed. In many cases, governments may have an alternative policy at their disposal
to target the same policy objective, but with different political ramifications, leading to a
subtler kind of policy spill-over. Yet, a large share of diffusion research usually concentrates
on incentives for adoption of one particular policy instrument, disregarding the substantial
implications that alternative policies may have for diffusion processes. As some recent work
indicates (Pelc, 2011; Rickard, 2012), neglecting the set of similarly targeted policies may bias
inference. If researchers fail to consider policy alternatives, they run the risk of incorrectly
estimating the overall effect of interdependence. Underestimating interdependence results in
overestimating domestic or systemic factors (Franzese and Hays, 2008). Thus, researchers may
find no diffusion when in fact states’ policy choices are interdependent.
This article explores the conditions under which countries may respond to the same in-
ternational policy influences by choosing an alternative policy instrument. We theoretically
consider the relation between governments’ incentives for policy adoption and the implemen-
tation of alternative diffusing policies borrowing from works on the local implementation of
global practices (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009) and the literature on conditional diffusion
(Martin, 2009; Neumayer and Plümper, 2012; Chaudoin et al., 2015), which suggest when and
why states may not copy policies from one another. At the same time, we draw on lessons from
the embedded liberalism research (Hays et al., 2005; Brooks and Kurtz, 2012; Wibbels, 2006)
to understand which domestic factors should likely condition policy coupling across countries.
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Our theory suggests that choosing alternative diffusing policies is a rational political choice
driven by a government’s incentive to compete with other countries while accepting domestic
constraints and the need to respond to a diffusing policy demand. We claim that this policy
alteration depends on the location where policies are implemented, as home governments may
strategically choose alternative policies based on how much they know about the policy abroad
and the extent of policy externalities. The impact of neighbors’ policies, we argue, is mediated
by the home country’s reliance on international economic flows, such as capital movements and
credit circulation. High economic flows can force a home government to accept the regulatory
interests of foreign investors, while low economic flows allow the government to take more
isolated decisions. Thus, we predict that if a policy is implemented in a neighboring country,
a government with lower economic flows has more leeway to implement its alternative policy
to minimize domestic adjustment costs.1 This is in contrast to the choice of governments with
higher economic flows, which have less liberty to deviate from policy conformity if the diffusing
policy at hand is implemented in a neighboring country.
To illustrate our argument, we consider one policy sphere where reactions to a common ex-
ternality are evident and alternative policy reactions are discernible. We focus on cross-national
environmental policymaking in Western countries. In this policy area, all governments are in
principle interested in addressing a global externality, e.g. air pollution, but national decision
makers can provide the public good with a number of politically different policies. Following our
theory, spatial contiguity should make the environmental policy adopted by bordering countries
more salient than the policy adopted by distant countries. For example, a green policy imple-
mented in the geographical proximity should increase the pressure on a government to adopt
that identical policy given that these policies are complements and that contact between two
governments increases the pressure to harmonize environmental regulation (Perkins and Neu-
mayer, 2012; Vogel, 1995). At the same time, decision makers should assess the material and
political costs of this policy choice, such as expenses for pollution mitigation or rising unemploy-
1As we discuss below, countries with lower economic flows may implement the alternative policy to avoid
onerous domestic costs or reap fortuitous benefits, such as attracting foreign firms willing to relocate as a
consequence to the policy abroad.
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ment in energy-intensive sectors, compared to an alternative policy. Following our theoretical
framework, we expect that in countries with high international economic flows, which are often
tied to international environmental standards (Vogel, 1995), governments have less liberty to
reject diffusing environmental policies. So, on average, these governments should give in to the
international pressure to adopt their neighbor’s environmental policy instrument. By contrast,
in more economically isolated countries, governments can prioritize domestic protection over
conforming to diffusing regulations while still responding to the larger need of abating pollu-
tion (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2015). Decision makers should then have more leeway in choosing a
functionally similar but structurally different environmental policy. Specifically, we expect that
a country’s adoption of a diffusing environmental policy vis-à-vis its alternative depends on a
country’s closeness to the source country of policy implementation combined with the level of
domestic dependence on international economic flows. As we will discuss, this hypothesis can
be adjusted to whether the alternative policies under consideration are considered substitutes
or complements to each other.
To empirically test our hypothesis, we make use of two different sets of data in which
green taxes are treated as the focal diffusing policy. Analyzing two separate datasets serves to
show the robustness of our argument in this policy area, and also highlights how alternative
policy adoption materializes when policies are substitutes or complements. We first employ the
dataset of green taxation used by Ward and Cao (2012), to which we add a policy that is often
evoked in the public discussion of green taxes, namely environmentally relevant subsidies. We
show that green taxes follow adoption patterns that are dependent on the level of economic flows
of the country that adopts them and on where the subsidy policy is implemented. Specifically,
we find that, given low levels of economic flows, governments are more likely to implement
green taxes if their proximate neighbors have previously implemented a green subsidy. Vice
versa, countries with high levels of economic flows are more likely to adopt taxes if the close
neighbors have implemented the same policy. The results confirm our prediction that countries
adjust their policy choices based on how far they are from other implementing countries and
how constrained they are by external capital flows.
In a second step, we present an original study of two climate change policies – namely
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carbon-related taxes and carbon trading allowances – diffusing in Europe in 2000-2010. We
show that these two policies also vary in terms of adoption across time and space, and while
countries with high levels of economic flows react to neighbors implementing either type of car-
bon policy by adopting the same policy, countries with lower levels of economic flows are less
likely to adopt the neighbors’ focal policy. This finding provides additional evidence that gov-
ernments strategically pursue the environmental policy that is most suitable to their domestic
motivations and geographic considerations.
Our results provide a new perspective on environmental policymaking in the globalized era.
In addition, the article makes several contributions to international and comparative politics
research. First, our findings suggest that alternative policies have important effects on policy
adoption, and that ignoring them may bias the inference on the overall extent of international
interdependence. Consequently, we offer a potential explanation for the failure to detect policy
spill-overs when cross-border interdependence is complex. Additionally, our theoretical angle
informs important debates on the new politics of interdependence and the complex interactions
in international relations (Chaudoin et al., 2015; Oatley, 2011). In line with recent analyses
of the adaptation of globalization in developed countries (Farrell and Newman, 2015), our
evidence indicates that regulatory disagreements may cause nuanced layering of regulatory
instruments. Furthermore, our argument provides support to the claim that governments can
maintain domestic policy control under conditions of international interdependence (Cao et al.,
2007; Rickard, 2012; Shipan and Volden, 2006).
Theoretical Framework
Rethinking the Logic of Policy Diffusion
We first present an argument for why countries may be more likely to choose policy alternatives
when multiple policies are diffusing. In order to elaborate our logic of policy alteration, we first
introduce the basic logic of policy diffusion. In a classical policy diffusion scenario, government
officials usually assess the impact that the policy of other countries will have on their own
jurisdictions. So, if country i adopts a new policy x that may affect country j, policy makers
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in the latter have to decide how to behave regarding this new instrument. Standard diffusion
theory posits the set of possible actions as a binary distribution of ‘adopt’ or ‘not adopt’ the
policy, or – for policy levels – ‘more’ or ‘less’ of the policy. Subsequently, researchers then
model the conditions under which country j is more or less responsive to the diffusing policy.
These conditions can be international and domestic in nature. With respect to interna-
tional drivers of policy diffusion, many researchers point to geographic proximity, for instance a
shared border (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Mukherjee and Singer,
2010).2 At the same time, a number of studies focus on more domestic mechanisms of common
policy choices, such as structural pressures to compete for capital assets (Swank, 2006) and
political disagreements on free–market reforms (Elkins and Simmons, 2004). While these works
have greatly contributed to the understanding of policy interdependence, most of them neglect
alternative policies to the instrument they focus on, de facto assuming that these have null ef-
fects on the adoption of the focal policy. This assumption seems puzzling because interrelated
policies are often invoked in the debate that justifies policy choice. Precisely because policy
alternatives may be implemented instead of, or in combination with, the focal diffusing policy,
interdependence may be subtler than classical diffusion theory may suggest. Thus, it is up to
debate whether considering the different policy options in a diffusion scenario may be necessary
to fully understand the scope of policy diffusion.
This concern has stimulated a number of studies that highlight how, in a context of dif-
fusion, policies may not be simply copied or rejected. Along these lines, conditional diffusion
researchers have suggested that jurisdictions may have different sensitivities to a common exter-
nal policy pressure. Consequently, the implementation of a diffusing policy may be adapted to
domestic political circumstances (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Martin, 2009; Gilardi, 2010;
Neumayer and Plümper, 2012). National legal contexts may also intermediate the absorption
of diffusing regulation. For example, Halliday and Carruthers (2009) suggest that, as local ju-
risdictions confront a new diffusing policy, decision makers may accept some particular features
2Of course, closeness need not be expressed in terms of physical vicinity. Beck et al. (2006), for example, use
both trade flows and capital distances to establish different connections between countries. In a similar vein,
cultural similarity has been identified as a policy diffusion mechanism.
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of a policy package and reject others. This is in line with the insight from the varieties of cap-
italism literature, which discusses how institutional variations may determine a government’s
preferred economic policy over another. For example, Kurtz and Brooks (2008) show that
the diffusion of Keynesian demand-side fiscal policies may create variations in policy adoption
because national institutions may have ways to intercede in macroeconomic processes through
supply-side economic interventions.
Our argument aligns with these strands of the diffusion literature as we contend that the
implementation of diffusing policies will vary according to conditions at the domestic level
(Neumayer and Plümper, 2012). We agree that there may be coherent alternatives to the
path of policy diffusion that do not preclude interdependence but may involve competition
or learning (Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Volden et al., 2008). Consequently, despite consistent
pressure that should push governments into adopting similar policies, policy convergence may
occur in more complex ways than classical diffusion theory would expect (Brooks and Kurtz,
2012; Kurtz and Brooks, 2008). At the same time, our argument departs from this body of
works in two significant ways. First, our argument indicates that complex diffusion patterns do
not only entail the domestic accommodation of a diffusing policy, but also the consideration of
separate policies that are functionally similar yet politically different from the focal policy. We
specifically concentrate on the links between two policies that belong to the same policy sphere
but are not necessarily part of the same policy package. Hence, we focus on varying levels
of diffusion when a larger set of policy options are considered – and not just when one policy
proposal is examined.3 Second, while our argument evokes a number of traditional conditions
for why a country may choose alternative policies, a crucial element of our theory is that the
direction of policy alteration is determined by the relation between the two policies. That is, we
argue that whether the alternative policies are complements or substitutes will also affect policy
choices. Thus, our argument sheds light on how heterogenous jurisdictions may be connected
by different policies that are themselves interdependent.
3While policies may have more than two alternatives, we believe focusing on two policies should be sufficient
to explicate the dynamics of policy alteration. Furthermore, from an empirical standpoint we think that tracing
one alternative instrument together with a focal policy may be enough to avoid omitted variable bias without
risking model overspecification.
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Explaining Diffusion Processes when Policies have Alternatives
To depict our logic, we describe the payoffs of adopting diffusing policies from the point of view
of a government. We assume the government to be a unified rational actor whose objective is to
maximize support in order to stay in power. Furthermore, we assume that the decision maker
should choose to implement a policy based on political considerations. In the presence of only
one diffusing policy, she should be interested in pursuing that policy if it increases the likelihood
that she may remain in office. For example, in the case of a developed democracy confronted
with a diffusing public policy, the decision maker would accept that policy if the majority of
her constituents were interested in seeing that instrument implemented domestically, which in
return would increase the probability that she will be re-elected in office. This also assumes
that the decision maker is able to balance the preference of the median voter and the interest
of private stakeholders. In the case of public good provision, she would implement a diffusing
policy that provides the public good to the point that the private interests are not penalized
in a way that would decrease overall support.
According to traditional diffusion research, there are a number of factors that may affect
these considerations and ultimately lead the decision maker to accept or refuse the diffusing
policy. On the domestic side, government ideology and industrial lobbying are examples of de-
terminants of decision makers’ positions on a diffusing policy. Internationally, regional learning,
trade relations and the influence of international organizations may equally affect the likeli-
hood of policy adoption. The relative relevance of these factors depends on the policy area.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that, when a decision maker is confronted only with
one diffusing policy, some of these mechanisms will consistently be in place. For example, the
geography of policy implementation should frequently matter, for neighbors are usually more
attentive to each other’s behavior (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). Similarly, democracies are more
likely to mimic each other as they often abide to the same policy demand (Starr, 1991).
We claim that the described decision making process significantly changes once we allow
for two functionally similar but structurally different policies to be considered. Not everything
differs, of course: even in a context in which policies have alternatives, the decision maker
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still faces pressure to react to externalities as in the case of one diffusing policy. However,
the number of ways in which the incumbent can satisfy the electorate increases as more policy
options become available. Thus, the decision maker now has the possibility to implement
a different policy that functionally addresses the same initial requirement but may produce
different political returns. More specifically, the decision maker can opt for the alternative
policy to the one that she observes being implemented in other jurisdictions if doing so benefits
her and her constituents.
We argue that decision makers will be more likely to implement alternative policies to the
diffusing policy if a number of conditions hold. Firstly, as the new varieties of diffusion research
suggest, subtle reactions to policy diffusion depend on where global policies are diffused from
and where they are received (Wibbels, 2006). This implies that policy alteration should be
linked to the geographic distance of implementing countries. Presumably, government officials
in two close countries have intertwined preferences that would lead to similar policy choices.
For instance, two countries sharing a border may often engage in a certain level of regulatory
harmonization (Franzese and Hays, 2006). Furthermore, due to regional interests and cross-
border relations, these countries may have constituents with similar preferences who would
probably demand a similar policy adoption (Gerber and Gibson, 2009). By contrast, two
countries that are further away from each other should be less exposed to the externalities of
each other’s policy choice, and the decision makers of insular countries should feel less pressure
to adopt a diffusing policy, everything else constant. Consequently, geographic considerations
may influence the capability of a government to consider deviating from policies observed
abroad.
While the political geography of policy diffusion should matter for alternative policy
choices, geography by itself constitutes only the international lenses through which decision
makers assess the potential benefits of alternative policies. Evidently, domestic considerations
should mediate how a diffusing policy is assessed in a country. For example, decision makers
could consider alternative policy options based on party ideology, because some alternative
policies may be preferred by left-leaning voters while others may be more embraced by conser-
vative voters. However, partisanship is not likely to generate the same effects across all types of
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countries. As Kurtz and Brooks (2008, 249) note, one should not assume that policy outcomes
follow seamlessly from partisan preferences, because whether governments follow their partisan
goals depends on a number of contextual factors, e.g. the strength of labor organizations. Thus,
for the sake of keeping our argument as generalizable as possible, we focus on more systemic
domestic considerations that could influence the decision makers’ policy adoption.
We argue that a country’s domestic constraints related to its level of international economic
integration should mediate the extent to which a decision maker may choose alternative policies
based on the policy implemented in neighboring countries. In particular, a country’s exposure
to international capital movements should influence the degree to which a government has
leeway in adopting internationally diffusing policies at home. To clarify, consider first the
effect of capital mobility when policies do not diffuse. Capital movement entails a decision
maker’s contacts with foreign private actors, such as multinational companies. These contacts
are usually attractive if they come at low domestic costs. So, if capital movement increases
domestic economic performance at the cost of no reform or policy adoption, then the decision
maker should welcome further capital flows without any restriction (Globerman and Shapiro,
2002). Yet, governments may also have to address questions of regulatory harmonization and
policy integration.
Governments in countries with high economic flows should be more willing to adjust to
diffusing policies compared to countries with low economic flows, because the former care about
the access to capital at the cost of linking it to internationally diffusing regulations (Hays et al.,
2005). This entails that high capital mobility countries may be more constrained to accept
diffusing policies. We conjecture that countries with high economic flows should be especially
prone to adopt a foreign policy if it is implemented in a geographically close country. For
example, a country with high capital mobility may be more likely to learn coping mechanisms
to a foreign policy from neighboring countries that have implemented it (Blonigen et al., 2007).
Moreover, close countries with high economic flows are more likely to share political and legal
approaches to policy adjustment, so learning from neighbors seems a feasible choice for these
governments (Dreher et al., 2013).
Vice versa, government officials of countries with low economic flows should face lower
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pressure to adjust to policies from abroad, given the relatively smaller dependence on the
policy regime of foreign investors. Hence, in this type of country, decision makers have more
leeway to respond to diffusing policies with policy alteration. Surely in the case in which a
diffusing policy requires onerous domestic adjustments, the government of a country with low
economic flows may try to avoid that particular policy. Yet, this does not necessarily mean
that the country does not implement any policy. Rather, the government may implement
an alternative policy that responds to the general policy need while protecting the interests
of the home country. Alternatively, the government may choose a different policy to reap
political benefits, for example from attracting the losers from that onerous diffusing policy.
This alternative outcome should be particularly prominent for low economic flows countries
that observe neighbors adopting a focal policy, because these countries do not need to converge
on the regional policy equilibrium and have a costless incentive to compete with others (Plümper
et al., 2009). In sum, countries with high levels of economic integration should adjust to the
policies of neighbors by adopting the same policy, while less economically integrated countries
should have more liberty to deviate from the trend of proximate countries, and can implement
alternative instruments.
The testable implication of our argument is that countries at different levels of international
economic integration should be differently sensitive to policy diffusion depending on where the
policies are adopted. Before turning to the area of environmental policy, we should clarify how
‘alternative’ policies can be identified. Evidently, the choice to adopt any policy instruments
depends on the framing of domestic politics (Jacoby, 2000). In this article, we keep with the
notion that alternative policies are strategic complements or substitutes that simultaneously
emerge in the public discourse across several countries (Franzese and Hays, 2008). That is to
say, the rate of substitution of the alternative policies should affect policy implementation. The
rate of substitution depends on the properties of each policy as well as their relative importance
for a government. For example, a government may decide to either adopt a diffusing policy x
or opt for an alternative policy y. From a theoretical perspective, it is possible that the two
alternative policies are mutually exclusive substitutes of which governments may adopt either
one or the other, but not both. Decision makers may then substitute adoption of policy x for
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the adoption of policy y, and vice versa, e.g. when one policy is deemed sufficient to achieve
a desired policy goal. However, in a perhaps more realistic scenario, the two alternatives may
also be substitutable by degree. Decision-makers may then adopt a level of policy x and a
level of policy y. This does not necessarily affect the rate of substitution, but allows decision
makers to take advantage of situations in which complementary effects of two policies generate
higher utility than mere substitution.4 To better illustrate the implications of substitutable
and complementary effects of policies, we discuss these dynamics together with the empirical
applications below.
Application: Environmental Policies in Advanced Democ-
racies
Environmental degradation is an important source of cross-national policy diffusion, because
a country’s pollution has international consequences and states should adapt to each other’s
policies to decrease environmental risks. Although mitigation is expensive, most governments
in developed democracies seek to address pollution, because failure to act may have electoral
consequences. Hence, domestic decision makers regularly discuss environmental options to
agree on an efficient policy at a politically affordable price.
One of the traditional measures to abate pollution is green taxation. An environmental
tax is an excise tax targeted at environmental pollutants and goods whose production increases
pollution. Green taxes are often implemented in developed democracies with large welfare states
that feature market progressive executives or strong green parties. Moreover, a big obstacle
to green tax implementation is the coalition of industrial polluters, especially firms that lag
behind the clean technologies needed to lower the environmental costs of production. Hence,
a green tax that sustains economic performance but also generates the revenue to compensate
the domestic losers of mitigation can be adopted across a diverse number of countries (Stavins,
2008).
4To be sure, whether an alternative policy y is seen as a substitute or complement to a focal policy x by
policy-makers is not only dependent on the properties of a policy, but also on the context of implementation.
That is, in two different contexts, the same policy can be seen as a substitute or a complement to an alternative
policy.
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In practice, not all countries are complaisant with green taxes, or at least not at all times.5
In fact, policy makers can alternatively address environmental degradation by choosing poli-
cies to either substitute or substantiate green taxes or enhance their effect. We focus on two
alternatives to green taxation that are often considered in public debates. The first policy is a
green subsidy. Environmentally motivated subsidies are grants and soft loans given to polluters
willing to cut pollution. Sometimes green subsidies are directly linked to taxes, because exec-
utives earmark a green fee and later redistribute the revenue as an endowment. However, the
links between subsidies and taxes are not always explicit, and often a subsidy scheme may exist
without the implementation of a tax.6 Moreover, subsidies have different political implications
when compared to taxes, and may shape governments’ strategic considerations accordingly
(Rickard, 2012). In the environmental area, subsidies may be linked to trading fees, which
means that governments allocate green subsidies not upon collection of green taxes but based
on international trading considerations. Similarly, policy makers can prefer a green subsidy to
a tax because the former preserves the status quo of firms that threaten to relocate under the
tax, while it increases political support among subsidized polluters.7
The second alternative policy to a green tax is an abatement credit allowance. This policy
usually involves a fixed quantity of permits that polluters exchange among themselves in an
abatement ‘market’. The permit price plays a role analogous to a tax: firms with high costs
of reducing pollution buy permits that let them continue to pollute, while those that can cut
pollution at lower costs will do so and then sell their unused permits. Tradable credit schemes
however have specific distributional effects, and therefore present different payoffs to policy
makers in comparison to green taxes. They can be particularly useful if government officials
have a weak control of bureaucracy or if monitoring tax collection is more costly than providing
credits. Moreover, allowances can be instrumental if they are given away to critical polluters
5For example, in 2012 Australia agreed to a fixed-price carbon tax, but in November 2013 the executive
scrapped the carbon tax and voted in favour of an emission trading scheme.
6To illustrate, all recent German environmental subsidies are categorized as capital investment grants, and
none represents a direct tax reduction (OECD 2015).
7Surely long and large subsidies risk inflating fiscal debts. However, assuming an increasing consumer
preference for clean products, subsidies may pay off in terms of increasing green exports and trade.
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with competitive advantages in the global economy (Victor and House, 2006).8 Together with
green taxes and environmental subsidies, the trading of pollution allowances belongs to the set
of environmental instruments available to each domestic government when pollution becomes a
salient public policy. We expect policy makers to assess the advantages of implementing either
of these instruments in the ways that we describe below.
Environmental Policy Adoption with Alternative Policies
In a context of international interdependence, proximate developed countries should easily
learn about each other’s environmental practices and should quickly adjust to them. Thus,
we expect that the higher the distance between two countries, the lower the likelihood that
the green policy introduced in one country will influence the other. This expectation is in
line with the literature that points to the importance of learning in the international diffusion
of environmental practices, given that most governments are pressed to respond to domestic
demands for environmental public goods (Busch and Jörgens, 2005; Holzinger et al., 2011).
We also expect that environmental policy diffusion should be deeply intertwined with
competition for economic resources, and that internal cost considerations could constrain the
adoption of international environmental policies (Tews et al., 2003). Tracing this to the effect
of capital flows, decision makers in countries with high volumes of foreign capital should have
incentives to pursue tighter regulation to emulate the stringent standards of countries they may
depend on. By contrast, countries that depend on fewer economic flows may have incentives
to diversify their policy options and adopt more opportunistic responses to policy diffusion.
Following this logic, countries should adopt diffusing environmental policies as a function of
the interaction of the geographic distance from other implementing countries and the home
country’s level of international economic flows.
Note however that policy adoption should also vary as a function of the relationship be-
tween the alternative policies and the context of implementation. That is, if diffusing policy x
8Of course, if a government has a weak bureaucracy, then it may not want to implement a system that
requires careful monitoring of thousands of polluters. At the same time, if credits are cheap and easy to
allocate, allowances may also constitute a form of subsidy. Then again, credits are not necessarily linked to
taxes and may be handled as a separate type of policy.
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is the alternative of policy y, either may be decreased or increased based on whether x and y
are substitutes or complements conditional on contextual factors. Figure 1 sketches hypotheses
with regard to what would occur to policy diffusion when we vary geographic distance to foreign
implementation, level of international economic flows, and substitutability of the alternative
policy. To provide an intuition for the policy outcome under these three factors, let us expand
on each of the hypotheses that is contained in one quadrant of Figure 1.
SUBSTITUTES COMPLEMENTS
If foreign country i adopts x,
then in home country j:
If foreign country i adopts x,
then in home country j:
W x ↓ W x ↑
EI↑
EI↓
x
y
↓
↑
x
y
↑
↓
x
y
↑
↓
x
y
↓
↑
W x ↓ W x ↑
1.1
1.3
1.2
1.4
2.1
2.3
2.2
2.4
EI↑
EI↓
x
y
↓
↓
x
y
↑
↑
x
y
↑
↑
x
y
↓
↓
Figure 1: Theoretical expectations. The table shows policies a home government should hypothetically
adopt as geographical distance from implementation of policy x (W x) and economic integration in
international capital flows (EI) vary. Note that x and y refer to policies with equivalent functional
purposes.
First consider the scenario on the left side of Figure 1 in which two green policies are
substitutes. Governments can trade off one of these policies against the other. In the absence
of diffusion, a country should choose one of two substitute policies based on domestic rationales.
By contrast, in the presence of diffusion, a country may choose the first policy adopted by the
neighbors at the cost of the other. We expect that this should be especially the decision
for countries with high level of economic flows (quadrant 1.1), as these should be especially
sensitive to foreign policies from proximate investors and donors. In reverse, a country that is
located far away from the place where a policy is first implemented is less likely to be involved
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in the diffusion of that policy, hence increasing the likelihood for the substitute policy to be
implemented (1.2).
Now consider a less economically integrated country and the emanating theoretical expec-
tations. In a context in which neighboring countries may be adopting one of two substitutable
policies, decision makers in this country should react as if these policies constitute opportu-
nities to seek international gains and further compete in the global economy. For example, if
neighbouring countries adopt a green tax, policy makers may adopt subsidies to attract the
polluting firms willing to relocate because of the neighbour’s tax. So, if two policies are sub-
stitutes, governments in countries with fewer international capital flows should differentiate
policies compared to their neighbors and choose the alternative policy of close countries (1.3).
Vice versa, we expect that governments have low incentives to increase the level of the alter-
native policy when diffusing policies are far away (1.4). In other words, the implementation of
a policy in distant countries decreases the level of the substitute policy in a country with low
economic flows.
Now let us turn to diffusing policies that are complements, which is to say that govern-
ments can adopt them simultaneously because the policies reinforce each other. In the case of
a country with high global capital flows, we hypothesize that the adoption of either policy in
a neighboring country should incentivize the government to adopt both instruments, as either
can be used to reach further harmonization with foreign capital investors, assuming they are
proximate (2.1). Vice versa, a policy adopted in distant countries should decrease the direct
pressure to quickly adjust to the new policy regime, and the decision maker should be less
likely to adopt either policy (2.2). Once again, we expect the policy outcomes to be different
for countries with fewer capital flows. In these countries, the decision maker has strategic
reasons to adopt the alternative policy of distant countries because it faces smaller costs from
deviating from the neighbors’ trends. For example, if a neighbor implements a new green tax in
conjunction with a subsidy, a less economically integrated country has an incentive to decrease
both policies, for example, to attract foreign companies willing to relocate.9 Vice versa, deci-
9This may look more like ‘free-riding’, but it really just implies that the country is more likely to adopt an
alternative policy from distant countries, ceteris paribus.
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sion makers who observe the complementary policies being implemented in distant countries
can show policy initiative and adopt that same policy. A subsidy for clean technologies, for
example, may attract distant firms while allowing the government to claim the provision of
public good. So, we expect that in less economically integrated countries the implementation
of complementary policies in close countries should decrease the likelihood that either is im-
plemented at home (2.3). By contrast, the implementation in distant countries should increase
the adoption of either policy (2.4).
Research Design, Data and Empirical Analyses
We test our argument in the environmental area with two separate statistical analyses. For
both analyses we employ spatial econometric models of policy diffusion, which allow us to
effectively specify the geography-based considerations of our theory (Neumayer and Plümper,
2012; Gilardi, 2016). Our first test (case 1) expands on the study of green taxes put forward
by Ward and Cao (2012). Specifically, we explore how environmental subsidy adoption affects
green tax diffusion in OECD countries from 1995 to 2004. For our second study (case 2), we
collected data on climate change policies in the peripheral European countries to trace how
carbon allowances may have influenced levels of carbon-related taxes in the years 2000-2010.
Together, these two studies present evidence that certain countries consistently exploit policy
alteration, especially if their domestic dependence on international economic flows interacts
with the distance to other implementing countries.
The two analyses also indicate how the dynamics of policy alteration may vary if the
policies under consideration are related to each other as either substitutes or complements.
Although there may be reasons for why environmental taxes, subsidies and allowances should
complement or substitute each other in developed democracies, we do not attempt a theoretical
expectation on whether these specific policies are more likely to be complements or substitutes,
and we allow the data to show us the relations between the selected policies in the samples we
study. Thus, our sole assumption is that the rate of substitution of these policies varies within
and across countries.
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Case 1: Green Taxation in OECD Countries
We first test our argument against a published dataset that is directly linked to our argument
of policy alteration in the environmental area. We use the framework proposed in Ward and
Cao (2012, W&C), where the authors evaluate the diffusion of green taxes in OECD coun-
tries between 1995 and 2004. W&C identify a number of domestic and international factors
that presumably affect a government’s decision to raise green taxes. Using uniparametric and
multiparametric spatiotemporal autoregressive models (Hays et al., 2010), the authors find
that green tax burdens are influenced by the positions of legislative medians, the power of the
energy-producing sector, and international networks generated through trade and environmen-
tal intergovernmental organizations. While W&C do not find evidence for tax competition,
they note that not all countries show a consistent pattern in tax coordination, possibly because
alternative ‘affinities between states’ condition the adoption of green taxes.
We re-assess W&C’s findings in light of alternative policy choices, focusing in particular
on green subsidies (OECD 2015). Green subsidies comprise renewable energy grants, clean
technology support and environmental soft loans, most of which exist within a subsidy scheme
that is separate from environmental taxes. If our hypothesis is correct, decision makers should
adjust their level of green taxes compared to how closer countries are implementing subsidies,
and these adjustments should vary across countries with high and low economic flows.
Environmental Taxes and Subsidies Data
To measure green taxes we use the original W&C variable that captures revenues from fees that
the OECD deems to be environmentally relevant. The green tax per capita is denominated
in constant U.S. dollars and is available for 25 OECD members.10 Notably, green taxes vary
across time and across countries. Although they are generally lower in poorer countries, some
post-Communist countries significantly raised them in the early 2000s, reaching double the
tax levels of environmentally ambitious nations such as New Zealand. Similarly, while policy
coordination in the European Union has facilitated an increase in green taxes in Western
10The panel is unbalanced as some countries such as Iceland and Turkey have no complete series.
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European countries, the tax base is still relatively low in rich countries like the United States
and Canada.
To measure green subsidies, we collected the net financial value (amount of grants, soft
loans and guarantees) of all environmentally motivated subsidies provided in a given year in
the same 25 OECD countries.11 We standardized the figures weighing them by constant GDP
per capita. The highest levels of subsidies range above 15,000 USD per capita (500 million
USD) in countries like Switzerland and the UK in the early 2000s. However, subsidies also
reached high values in other countries, for example the United States during the later years
of the Clinton administration when the government invested in green energy and renewable
technology. Note that the data contains missing values, thus we perform linear interpolations
and use the estimated means of ten simulated values to avoid listless deletion.12
It is worth noting that green subsidies are often implemented before or separately from
green taxes. For example, Denmark and Germany established a national subsidy for wind
turbine electricity in the 1980s, years before a substantively related tax.13 Subsidies also have
an inverse relationship with taxes in some states but not in others. For example, while in
Sweden green taxes and environmental subsidies followed parallel trends, in Turkey they have
not. More importantly, the descriptive statistics suggest that geographically close countries
react to other policies of neighboring countries. To illustrate, consider countries in Central
Europe (Figure 2). According to our theory, these countries should be sensitive to each other’s
policies, but at the same time their sensitivities should vary by their dependence on economic
flows. Relatedly, the data show that high capital flows countries like Austria and Germany
have had similar long-term trends with respect to green policies: taxes increased due to more
stringent environmental policies within the European Union, and subsidies to GDP were mostly
low. However, bordering Eastern countries behaved differently. The Czech Republic adopted
ambitious tax targets and increased its per capita rate even earlier than Austria. By contrast,
Poland, which is equally influenced by EU policies, substantially raised subsidies in the 2000s.
11Database on instruments used for environmental policy, http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/Default.aspx.
12The proportion of missing–at–random data is thirty percent. To infer the missing values, we use a standard
repeated-imputation Bayesian simulation.
13Moreover, the EU has increased carbon–related subsidies issuance by 30% in the past twenty years without
yet accomplishing a harmonized carbon tax (Holzinger et al., 2011).
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Figure 2: Green Taxes and Green Subsidies, 1995–2004: Policy Level Trends for Selected
OECD Countries.
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The patterns in the Czech Republic and Poland reflect in part an Eastern European reac-
tion to Western stimuli for reform and regulatory measures (Andonova et al., 2007). We think
they also importantly echo our theory. On the one hand, the Czech government decided to
pursue more stringent green policies, possibly because it was preparing for EU membership.
Along these lines, anecdotal evidence confirms that in order to show good environmental prac-
tice, the Czech government raised the cost of gasoline at the rate of the Austrian neighbors.14
By contrast, the Polish government decided to increase energy subsidies as European leaders
were due to finalize the EU 2030 green framework, possibly to incentivize German mining firms
to relocate.15 To verify whether this sort of policy coupling underlines the trends in green
taxation in the OECD countries, we now move to estimate the partial effects of alternative
policies distributed across space.
Independent Variables and Estimation Strategy
Following W&C, we test our hypothesis with a spatiotemporal autoregressive model (Franzese
and Hays, 2007). This model can appropriately estimate mechanisms of policy interdependence
across space. Moreover, it allows us to calculate the effects of endogenous spatial lags with
important temporal structures, which one may assume if countries adjust their budgetary
cycles in reaction to the ones of other countries. We also expect spatial lags to be often highly
related, so we use a multiparametric version of the spatiotemporal autoregressive model (Hays
et al., 2010).16 As our main dependent variable, Green tax, is continuous, we can work in a
framework of linear correlations. The specification of our linear multiparametric spatiotemporal
autoregressive (M-Star) model is:
Green taxi,t = ϕ Green taxi,t−1 + Xi,tβ + ρWiZi,t + ρWiGreen taxi,t + ρWiGreen subsidyi,t−1 +
ρWiGreen subsidyi,t−1×Economic flows + εi,t (1)
14In 2013, the rate of 1 liter of gasoline in Prague was 1:0.95 compared to Austria.
15Responding To Climate Change. 2014. Europe spends 10 Billion Euros a year on coal subsidies. http:
//www.rtcc.org/2014/10/13/europe-spends-e10bn-a-year-on-coal-subsidies/.
16Spatiotemporal models can solve bias problems that ordinary least squares (OLS) encounter if errors are
not serially independent. However, OLS estimation is often unbiased if one applies a one-year time lag to the
spatial lags and includes temporally lagged dependent variable (Franzese and Hays, 2008). Our model addresses
these potential sources of bias, so OLS is less of an issue for the analyses in the paper.
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where Economic flowsi,t also belongs to the subset of variables denoted byXi,t. In this specifica-
tion, Green taxi,t−1 is the autoregressive temporal lag that absorbs within-country idiosyncratic
variation (Ward and Gleditsch 2008). X is a battery of domestic factors presented in W&C,
while the connectivity matrices W capture the effects of international factors Z, identified in
W&C. The parameter k,i,t is the error term. We first discuss the domestic and international
variables that, keeping with W&C’s original model, we include in our specification. We then
move to the central predictors of our model, namely WiGreen subsidyi,t−1 and its interaction
with Economic flows.
Our econometric model of green tax diffusion distinguishes several domestic and interna-
tional explanatory variables. The domestic variables include the left–right position of national
legislators and their environmental position (Klingemann et al., 2006), as well as a dummy
if green party members are elected to the lower house. An indicator of energy production as
kilograms of CO2 emitted per dollars of GDP (WDI, 2012) is added to proxy the power of
polluting lobbying sectors. Similarly, in our effort to mirror W&C, we estimate the coefficients
of GDP per capita and unemployment and their respective squared terms (WDI, 2012), as well
as income tax as a percentage of GDP (WDI, 2012) in order to capture the effects of wealth
and fiscal pressure on green taxes. Crucially for our argument, we operationalize the Inter-
national Economic Flows with the index of globalization (Dreher, 2007) employed in W&C.
This measure ranges from 0 to 100 and captures the effect of foreign direct investment and
cross-national portfolio investments on green taxes.17
Regarding the international variables in the model, we make use of W&C’s same connec-
tivity matrices, W, which are of the form NT × NT with TN × N submatrices along the
block diagonal, and are multiplied with the dependent variable to generate the spatial lags.18
W&C’s model includes the following lags: Wgeographic distance, which measures the green tax
17The Dreher indicator, which is available in Ward and Cao’s dataset, is derived from a principal components
analysis of data on a nation’s foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and income payments to foreign
nationals. Table 1 of Dreher (2007) suggests that foreign investment flows have the biggest weight in this
index. Hence, we are confident that this measure of international economic flows captures the impact of foreign
investors referred in our theoretical discussion.
18The authors row standardize to allow the sum of each row to be 1. Consequently, the estimated values of
the spatial coefficient, ρ, reflect the average influence of other countries’ geographical location.
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lag over the distance in kilometers between national capital cities (Ward and Gleditsch 2008);
Wdyadic trade, which is the green tax weighted by the bilateral trade flows from one country
to another (Barbieri et al., 2009); and WIGOs, which is the green tax proportional to the
shared memberships in environmental international organizations (Ingram et al., 2005). We
implement these lags in our analysis as well. However, note that we estimate the geography
lag not only for green taxes but also for subsidies, which is central to our theoretical argument.
Specifically, we propose the spatial lag Wgeographic distance ∗ green subsidyt−1, which
represents the average subsidy level across geographically connected countries. The OECD
sample in W&C includes proximate European countries as well as distant countries such Japan,
Australia and New Zealand, which are further than 15,000 km away from most Western capitals.
To avoid that these long distances may distort our spatial lag of interest, we calculate the
Wgeographic distance ∗ green subsidyt−1 lag for countries whose relative distance is less than
1,000 kilometers (Cao, 2010).19 We multiply this matrix to the one-year lag of taxes not only
to avoid simultaneity bias (Beck et al., 2006; Franzese and Hays, 2007), but also to capture the
strategic dynamics suggested by our theory, i.e. that domestic decisions should strategically
follow foreign decisions. The matrix is row standardized to stay consistent with W&C and hold
their assumption about the influence of geographic distances.20
Our baseline M-Star model does not include country fixed effects because the specification
already contains the temporally lagged dependent variable, and together with fixed effects this
may generate simultaneity bias. However, including the country dummies to capture idiosyn-
cratic national characteristics in policy adoption does not change our main findings, as we show
below. One may also worry that, because green taxes and environmentally motivated subsidies
represent two endogenous policy choices faced by the same national government at each point
in time, the correct model should comprise a system of simultaneous equations where the error
19This means we assign zeros for the cells of the geography matrix where the countries are more than 1,000
km distant. Evidently, the matrix with all distances generates a much more sparsely distributed spatial lag on
geographic distance, as we discuss below. Note that spatially lagging the green tax on our more constrained
matrix of geographic distance does not affect our main results.
20Row standardization is consistent with the assumption that a country is influenced by its neighbours and
the importance of each neighbour is related to its relative distance (Elhorst, 2003). This assumption in contrast
with Plümper and Neumayer (2010), who argue that each unit’s influence measured as a proportion of the
other units is not always appropriate. For our purposes, it is reassuring that our results are not altered by the
row-standardization choice, as we note below.
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terms are assumed to be correlated. To respond to this concern, in additional analyses we
employ a simultaneous equation model with two structural equations. Each structural equa-
tion has green tax or green subsidy as its own dependent variable and the same explanatory
variables denoted in Equation (1) but the spatial and temporal lags of the dependent variable.
We gauge the simultaneous equations using three-stage least squares (3SLS), which is an esti-
mator that combines a two-stage estimation of endogenous structural equations with seemingly
unrelated regressions.21 As we will discuss, the 3SLS models show that our baseline estimations
are robust, thus supporting our inferences on policy alteration.
Results
Broadly put, our theory suggests that, conditional on international economic flows, a govern-
ment’s adoption of a green policy should vary as a function of where it observes other deci-
sion makers implementing alternative policies. Additionally, our argument predicts the policy
choices of close countries based on the relation of the policies under consideration. Precisely
because it is useful to understand the relation between green tax and subsidy in our dataset,
our first empirical specification estimates W&C’s model of green taxes to which we only add
green subsidy as a covariate.
Column 1 in Table 1 reports the coefficients of this first model. In line with W&C’s
results, we find that GDP has an inverted-U shape relationship with green taxes, while higher
income taxes are linearly associated with higher green policy levels. We also find that left-wing
governments tend to raise green taxes compared to conservative governments. We do not find
a statistically significant effect of executives’ environmental positions, and the actual economic
flows have a negative coefficient but the confidence intervals include zero. The coefficient of
the temporal lag indicates that previous green tax levels are important predictors of today’s
21Three-stage least squares produce estimates from a three-step process. First, instrumented values for all
endogenous variables are considered similarly to the first step in a two-stage least squares approach. Second,
estimates are calculated on the basis of the residuals from a 2SLS estimation of each structural equation. Finally,
a generalized least squares estimation is performed using the covariance matrix of the second stage and the
instrumented values in place of the right-hand-side endogenous variables. Like 2SLS, the 3SLS approach assumes
that the instrumental variables are relevantly correlated with the independent variables and uncorrelated with
the error term. We model unemployment and GDP per capita, their respective squared terms, energy production
and the country fixed effects as the predetermined exogenous variables that identify each equation, respectively.
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Table 1: Green Taxes and Green Subsidies in OECD countries: The Effect of Alternative Policy
Levels
M-Star models of Green Tax
(1) (2) (3)
Green taxt−1 0.90*** 0.87*** 0.90***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Green subsidyt−1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Energy production -10379 -10421 -2030
(18879) (19336) (19111)
GDP per capita -0.005** -0.001 -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP per capita sq. 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment 4.62 4.35 4.13
(4.82) (5.05) (4.94)
Unemployment sq. -0.34 -0.27 -0.30
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Income tax per capita 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.18***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.044)
Left-right position -1.38*** -1.68*** -1.34***
(0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
Environmental position 0.86 -7.66 -0.82
(8.47) (8.66) (8.52)
Environmental position sq. -0.78 0.12 -0.52
(0.81) (0.84) (0.82)
Green party -3.76 -6.76 -1.14
(12.1) (12.4) (12.0)
Actual economic flows -0.16 0.19 -0.76
(0.39) (0.38) (0.49)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax -0.081 0.137* -0.037
(0.082) (0.070) (0.084)
ρ: WIGOs*Green tax 0.43*** 0.006** 0.36***
(0.10) (0.003) (0.10)
ρ: Wdyadic trade*Green tax 0.12 0.39*** 0.17*
(0.087) (0.061) (0.089)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 -0.16 -0.14
(0.11) (0.12)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 × 0.003*
Actual economic flows (0.001)
Intercept -234.7*** -319.0*** -225.6***
(67.3) (67.2) (69.2)
σ 67.1*** 68.6*** 66.3***
(3.11) (3.18) (3.07)
N 233 233 233
Log-likelihood -1312.3 -1317.4 -1308.9
χ2 5926.5 5654.8 6082.5
Dependent variable is Green Tax Levels. The table reports linear M-Star coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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green taxes, while the negative (though insignificant) coefficient of the spatial lag indicates
that countries are less responsive to more distant countries’ green tax levels. Moreover, we find
that the spatial lag on environmental IGOs and, to a lesser extent, international trade relations
induce interdependence on green taxes, as suggested by the positive ρ coefficients. In addition,
Model 1 shows that the subsidy variable has a negative coefficient that approaches statistical
significance. This suggests that national green subsidies have inverse effects on green taxes,
and that in our sample these two policies may be used as substitutes to each other.
Moving to a specification that integrates the influence of alternative policies implemented
abroad, Model 2 shows the effect of the spatiotemporal lag of subsidies on geographical dis-
tance, keeping everything else constant. The results stay largely unvaried, beside the spa-
tial lag of green tax on geographical distance: the ρ becomes positive, hinting at the sen-
sitivity of this parameter to the inclusion of the subsidy variable. More importantly, the
Wgeographic distance ∗ green subsidyt−1 coefficient is negative and borders statistical signifi-
cance. This suggests that geographical distances with respect to green subsidies tend to de-
crease green tax levels. Put differently, close neighbors that increase a subsidy may weakly
decrease a country’s likelihood to implement high green taxes, possibly because they put pres-
sure on a domestic government to accept their policy. But does this effect vary if one considers
whether the country is more or less dependent on international economic flows?
In Model 3 we test this conjecture by integrating the interaction between economic flows
and the spatial lags of green subsidies. We find that the variable Wgeographic distance*Green
subsidyt−1 multiplied by actual economic flows is positive and statistically significant. This
suggests that, given high levels of economic flows, countries that observe neighbors implement
more green subsidies in line with the principle of substitution are less likely to raise green
taxes. By contrast, given low levels of economic flows, countries that see neighbors implement
subsidies are more likely to raise green taxes. In essence, this finding indicates that, while high
capital flows countries often implement the policy of their proximate countries, low capital
flows countries are more likely to deviate from this trend. Thus, the evidence confirms that
governments in less economically integrated countries do respond to the pressures to adopt a
green policy by employing the alternative to a neighbor’s instrument.
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The interaction effect in Table 1 is illustrated in Figure 3. The plots show how economic
flows affect green tax levels at different values of the spatial lag of green subsidies on geographic
distances. When economically integrated countries are geographically proximate to countries
that spend as much as 2000 dollars per capita on subsidies, their governments can be expected
to raise taxes up to 650 dollars per capita. However, green taxes are on average below 600
dollars per capita if the spatial connection dissipates, which supports our proposition that high
economic flows countries are more likely to adjust to a neighbor’s policy mix. By contrast, less
economically integrated countries that are connected to neighbors with subsidies amounting
to 2000 dollars are more likely to have tax levels around 650 dollars, and are more likely to
increase taxes if the spatial connection dissipates.
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Figure 3: Effects of Economic Flows and Spatially Lagged Green Subsidies on Green Taxes. This
figure is based on Model 3 from Table 1. The upper plots illustrate the marginal effects (solid line)
and the 90% confidence interval (dashed line) of the spatial clustering of subsidies on the level of green
taxes conditional on international economic flows. The histograms show the spatially lagged subsidies
of countries above and below the mean value of the economic flows distribution.
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The findings are robust to a number of sensitivity tests that we report in the Appendix.
Our results are virtually unaltered if we run a spatial lag OLS model, and they are different in
magnitudes but qualitatively identical if we do not row-standardize our main connectivity ma-
trix. As we noted above, we also ran 3SLS estimations. In the 3SLS procedure, we endogenize
the effects of the two alternative policies, including their respective spatial lags.22 The results
reported in the Appendix show that there is a positive and significant link between green taxes
and the spatial lag of green subsidies interacted with economic flows. While we do not report
this mechanism for the subsidy equation where the interaction is insignificant, this finding does
not affect the implication that green taxes are influenced by other countries’ subsidy levels.
Finally, one may wonder whether our inferences are limited by the choice to constrain
the connectivity matrices to the 1,000 km, and how the results would change if we considered
all distances across the observed OECD members, at the cost of bifurcating the sample be-
tween Europe, North America and distant countries in the Pacific Ocean. The results from
these additional estimations show that leveraging the entire range of geographic distances in
the connectivity matrices overturns the multiplicative coefficients. Specifically, the additional
results indicate that countries with high economic flows are more likely to choose high taxes if
they are more proximate to countries with higher subsidies (and thus lower taxes), while low
economic flows countries are more likely to choose taxes if proximate countries implemented
lower subsidies (and thus higher taxes). There are two ways to interpret the dissimilarity
between this finding and the main results in Table 1. One is that, while within the dis-
tances of the constrained geography matrix these policies are substitutes, they may actually
be complements across the world. Another way to think about these results is to consider how
the observations of the most insular countries may influence the model. We find that at the
top of theWgeographic distance ∗ green subsidyt−1 distribution are most distant countries like
Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, Japan, which has implemented very high levels of
22In the full form, each of the two structural equations has each of the two policies – green taxes
or green subsidies – in the left-hand side, while the right hand-side includes the autoregressive temporal
lag, the independent domestic variables and the vectorized international variables in Equation (1). Ad-
ditionally, we include the Wgeographic distance ∗ green subsidyt−1 if the outcome is green tax, otherwise
Wgeographic distance ∗ green subsidyt−1 if the outcome is green subsidies, and we add the interaction between
the spatially weighted alternative policy and actual economic flows.
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environmental subsidies, is at the bottom of the economic flows variable. These distributional
characteristics suggest the most insular OECD countries that we dropped in our main analyses
may be choosing policies in idiosyncratic ways precisely because of their insularity. So, even if
the results that account for all geographical distances were true, our argument still holds in its
generality, as more and less economically integrated countries show different reactions to other
countries’ alternative policies channeled through space.
Case 2: Carbon Policies in the Greater European Area
We have shown evidence supporting our theory based on the relationship between green taxes
and environmentally motivated subsidies in OECD countries. Here we propose a second em-
pirical study that provides an additional test of our argument. Our second study focuses on
alternative instruments that are often evoked together in debates of climate change mitigation.
Specifically, we investigate the relation between carbon-related taxes and carbon trading al-
lowances in what we call the Greater European Area, a region at the border of the ‘core’ fifteen
members of the EU (EU15) between 2000 and 2010. In the course of the 2000s, cap-and-trade
in this region generated much debate on its costs and benefits compared to taxes. Since the
European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) was adopted in 2003, non-EU15 coun-
tries have differed in the speed and levels in which they implemented either carbon taxes or
carbon trading. For example, in 2002 the Slovenian government noted that “the introduction
of an emission permits market is a measure that may contribute to reducing the total costs
of emission reductions [...]. An interesting alternative to the emission permits market is the
introduction of trade in exemptions as part of carbon (CO2) tax.’23 Following our argument,
we explore whether countries in the Greater European Area have preferred alternatives to their
neighbours’ policies conditional on their international economic integration.
23Slovenia’s First National Report to the UNFCCC, p. 40. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/
sloenc1.pdf.
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Carbon Policy Data
To study the choice of alternative climate policies in the Greater European Area in the 2000s,
we focus on seventeen countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland,
and Turkey. We select these countries because at some point between 1950 and 2010 each
expressed interest in EU membership, so we can assume that these countries are all exposed
to the carbon policy options discussed in Europe at the time. However, for these countries
climate policies were not strictly top-down imposed, but they rather represent an outcome of
domestic decisions.24
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Figure 4: Adoption of carbon policies, 2000-2010: This figure shows the cumulative number of
European neighborhood countries that adopted carbon taxes (dotted line) and carbon trading
registries (solid line) across time.
Plotting the number of countries implementing a tax or a CO2 trade registry through
time, Figure 4 shows that the adoption of both policies picked up in the course of the 2000s.
However, because we are interested in continuous indicators of taxes and allowances for our
econometric analyses, we collected data for the levels of these two variables. To measure carbon
24We exclude Albania, Morocco and Serbia, because we see too many missing values on their basic covariates.
Moreover, these three countries do not meet the minimum threshold of $5000 GDP per capita, which we believe
to be required for a credible climate policy, in line with the cost of policy implementation in the Stern Review.
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taxes, we use the value of ‘energy taxes on fossil fuel content’ as percentage of GDP per capita,
which we collected from the European Commission’s ‘Country Chapters’ reports.25 While this
is not a straight-up carbon tax, it is the closest regulation of carbon-based fuels from CO2-
generating polluters observed in Europe. Over these years, we find that Norway has had the
most consistently high fossil fuel–related taxes, while Estonia and Slovenia have had the lowest
tax levels, below 80 dollars per capita.26
Carbon allowances are considered the alternative to carbon taxes, and we measure them by
the amount of tradable carbon credits countries possessed in each year since the establishment
of a national carbon trading registry. Carbon allowances are equivalent to the volume of
prevented or mitigated carbon emissions. More precisely, one allowance unit is calculated as
one tonne of CO2.27 The original data comes from the European Commission’s Community
Independent Transaction Log (CITL), which was set up following the 2003 European Union
emission trading directive. This directive requested an adoption of the carbon trading policy by
all EU countries, including new members. At the same time, several conditions were granted
to new member states that could consequentially slow down the policy adoption.28 These
conditions were effectively used by a number of the countries in our sample. Romania and
Bulgaria, for example, started operating its trading platform later than previously agreed.
For our measurement, we use the yearly deflated allowances reported in Abrell et al. (2011),
which are the CITL national allowances minus the national verified emissions (i.e. the emissions
for which most allowances are used at the source). Allowance volumes are more informative
than the simple adoption of a carbon trading registry or auction. However, they are reflective
of economic activity, so they need to be adjusted by gross domestic output. Consequently,
we weigh the allowances by per capita GDP. Our carbon allowances variable is at zero levels
25See the European Commission’s Tax Structures page, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/
taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/article_6047_en.htm, and at the Commis-
sion’s Taxation Data archive, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/economic_
analysis/data_on_taxation/index_en.htm.
26In our analyses we normalize the tax distribution to address the fact that the tax distribution is sparse and
there are many zeros. However, the results are qualitatively identical if we use the original scale.
27Different types of allowances exist, but the older one is the European Union allowance unit.
28For example, article 9 of the EU directive mentions that states can“issue allowances valid for a five-year
period beginning in 2008 to persons in respect [...] to emission reductions made by those persons on their national
territory during a three-year period beginning in 2005.” Similarly, articles 11 and 12 give a lot of flexibility in
terms of identifying the operators to monitor the emissions and enforcing penalties to infringements.
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for most countries between 2000 and 2003, at which point the EU passed the Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading Scheme Directive, thereby incentivizing neighbouring countries to
open auction houses and registries for emission trade at their discretion.29 In 2010, allowances
averaged the value of 1543 over the 17 sampled countries. To illustrate, they were at 11471
in Poland and 7248 in Romania. The time-country variation is also noticeable. For example,
Iceland has had no carbon taxes nor has it issued allowances per capita.30 Hungary in 2008
opened its first carbon trade registry but also established low tax levels.31 Similarly, Roma-
nia has been slow at adapting emission trading, but by 2007 it reached the highest levels of
allocation.32 Maps in the Appendix further illustrate the rates of adoption across the two
policies.
Key Variables and Estimation Strategy
Following our theory, we expect the international distribution of carbon allowances to be an
influential determinant of the diffusion of carbon taxes, especially for less economically inte-
grated countries that have more leeway to adopt the alternative policy. In line with the models
employed above, we test our hypothesis with multiparametric spatiotemporal lag (M-Star)
models. The full specification of our linear M-Star model is:
CO2 taxi,t = ϕ CO2 taxi,t−1 + Xi,tβ + ρWiCO2 taxi,t + ρWiCO2 allowancesi,t−1 +
ρWiCO2 allowancesi,t−1 × Economic flows + εi,t (2)
where Economic flowsi,t also belongs to a subset of variables denoted by Xi,t. As per our
previous discussion, in the right-hand side we include the autoregressive temporal lag and a
battery of domestic variables, X, to gauge the effects of other national determinants of carbon
tax levels (see Table 2). We include GDP per capita and its squared term (WDI, 2012) to
29The 2009 revised Directive governing the EU ETS decided to introduce a harmonised EU-wide approach
to the allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances to installations covered by the system. However, in the
period of our analysis all allowances are calculated by national governments, which had freedom of allocation.
30European Commission 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/
brochures/iceland_2013.pdf. Accessed 17 March 2014.
31http://www.unicreditanduniversities.eu/uploads/assets/CEE_BTA/Dora_Fazekas.pdf.
32Reuters 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/28/us-romania-co-idUSTRE77R0W920110828.
Accessed 17 March 2014.
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control for the nonlinear income effects on carbon taxes. Similarly, because pollution may be
a relatively low priority for citizens in the early stages of development but becomes a higher
priority as they become better off, we include CO2 per capita and its square term (WDI, 2012).
Energy production is the national production of energy in kilotons of oil equivalent divided
by real GDP (WDI, 2012), and captures the power of energy intensive sectors and energy
producers. For the political variables, we add a measure of government effectiveness (-2 to
2), which is a composite index of the coverage provided by public services, the quality of civil
service and its independence from political pressures (WDI, 2012). Furthermore, we include
the executive’s left-right position as measured by the Database of Political Institutions.33
Evidently, the carbon policies in the sampled countries are not independent from those
of the EU, not least because EU members often negotiate policy adoptions with neighboring
countries on a bilateral basis, especially if the admission to the Union is foreseeable. On the
one hand this is to our advantage, because it means that we can use the strong regional role
played by the EU to see how our countries delayed or accelerated their preferred policies. At
the same time, the role of EU conditionality has to be taken into account. Consequently, in
our regressions we include a dummy for EU integration, where 1 stands for whether a country
at point t was integrated in the Union, and 0 otherwise. More importantly for our analysis, we
introduce the variable EU economic flows to measure the dependence that a country has from
capital exchanges with the European Union. More specifically, we sum the balance of trade of
each of the selected countries, where lower values stand for a lower exchange.34
To capture the effects of international interdependence, the connectivity matrices W are
again calculated using the distance between capital cities.35 Wgeographic distance*CO2 tax is
the spatial lag of the response variable. By contrast, Wgeographic distance*CO2 allowances
is the spatial lag of the alternative policy, which we expect to have a significant effect on CO2
taxes across countries. We lag this by one year, to estimate causal effects of the geographical
33Ideally we would want to measure the legislative medians as estimated by the Comparative Manifesto
Projects, but some of our countries are not yet coded in that database.
34This data can be found at the Eurostat webpage (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/) and at the
European Commission Trade portal (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/).
35In additional estimations we also operationalized spatial ideological distances, but the results remain sub-
stantively unchanged.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
CO2 tax 129.8 154.9 0 676.7 187
CO2 tax (normalized) 18.5 22.3 0 100 187
CO2 allowances 847.8 2471.8 0 18556.0 187
GDP per capita 18076 18503 1612 93157 187
CO2 per capita 8.9 3.1 3.7 16.1 187
EU integration 0.4 0.5 0 1 187
Left-right position 2.1 0.8 1 3 187
EU economic flows -0.01 0.092 -0.38 0.45 187
Energy production -1692 51416 -209867 74513 180
Government effectiveness 0.9 0.6 -0.4 2.2 170
distribution of CO2 trading on the adoption of carbon taxes. Note that we row-standardize
W to stay consistent with the previous specification, but also because the countries under
consideration are clustered closely to each other and we are not concerned of ‘washing away’
spatial variance through standardization. We expect the spatial lag of carbon allowances to
interact with the EU economic flows measure, because countries more integrated with the EU
should adopt carbon trade together with carbon taxes especially if they are close to the EU
‘border.’ By contrast, countries that are less integrated should have more incentives to adopt
carbon taxes if they are far away from the EU.
Results
Before testing the full specification in Equation (2), Column 1 in Table 3 reports the results of a
model of CO2 taxes that only includes the domestic variables, the spatial lag of the dependent
variable, and the within-country carbon trading allowances. In this model, the temporal lag’s
coefficient explains much of the variation in CO2 taxes, and indicates that the previous year’s
levels significantly increase carbon taxes in the present year. Income does not have an important
effect, nor does it have an exponential relationship with CO2 taxes in our sample. By contrast,
CO2 emissions are correlated with the carbon taxes both linearly and in a U-shape relationship.
Although executive ideology is not statistically significant, government effectiveness and EU
integration are linked to carbon tax levels. Specifically, government effectiveness decreases the
level of carbon taxes, indicating that countries with weak public services and dysfunctional
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administrations may be less likely to adopt more complex and bureaucratic policies. Moreover,
once a country is admitted to the EU it is more likely to increase CO2 taxes. Note also that
learning from neighbouring countries does not drive the levels of carbon taxes, as shown by the
coefficient of the spatial lag of carbon taxes, which is negative but not statistically significant.
Altogether, this model suggests there are domestic motivations driving carbon taxes in EU
neighbours, and that these are not necessarily based on whether other countries have adopted
carbon taxes. Moreover, we find that, keeping everything else constant, the levels of carbon
allowances have a positive and statistically significant influence on carbon taxes, and that
countries involved in carbon trading are more likely to raise the level of carbon taxes. We
interpret this as evidence that carbon taxes and carbon trading are complementing policies,
and that carbon allowances may precede carbon taxes as a country builds its environmental
portfolio (notice that CO2 allowances is lagged by one year).
We then move to test whether the international diffusion of carbon allowances may affect
national levels of carbon taxes by introducing the spatial lag of carbon allowances. The re-
sults in Model 2 show that the coefficient ρ for Wgeographic distance*CO2 Allowancest−1 is
not significant but is negative, indicating that a country that is geographically distant from
another country that has invested in carbon trading has lower pressure to implement carbon
taxes. Moving to the full M-Star model (Equation 2), in Model 3 we calculate the coefficients
of the spatial lag of carbon taxes, the spatial lag of carbon allowances, and the interaction of
the spatial lag of carbon allowances with the indicator of economic integration. The ρ coef-
ficient of Wgeographic distance*CO2 Tax is negative but remains statistically insignificant.
EU economic flows produces a positive coefficient and reaches statistical significance, which in-
dicates that more integrated countries are more likely to raise carbon taxes. More importantly
for our argument, we find that the coefficient for Wgeographic distance*CO2 Allowancest−1
conditional on EU economic flows is negative and statistically significant. The interpretation
of this finding is that more economically integrated countries that border countries involved in
carbon trading are more likely to adopt the complementing policy, carbon taxes (and, plausi-
bly, carbon trading as well). By contrast, less economically integrated countries that border
countries involved in carbon trading are less likely to adopt carbon taxes, the focal policy.
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Table 3: Carbon Taxes in the Greater European Area and The Conditional Spatial Effect of
Carbon Allowances
M-Star models of CO2 Tax
(1) (2) (3)
CO2 Taxt−1 0.750*** 0.750*** 0.750**
( 0.053 ) ( 0.053 ) ( 0.052 )
CO2 Allowancest−1 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
Energy production -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 )
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
GDP per capita sq. -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
CO2 per capita 2.95* 2.96* 3.27**
( 1.68 ) ( 1.68 ) ( 1.65 )
CO2 per capita sq. -0.140* -0.140* -0.153*
( 0.083 ) ( 0.083 ) ( 0.082 )
Government effectiveness -6.47* -6.48** -6.72**
( 3.37 ) ( 3.37 ) ( 3.31 )
Left-right position -0.689 -0.652 -0.976
( 0.901 ) ( 0.901 ) ( 0.893 )
EU integration 9.10*** 9.10*** 10.26***
( 2.29 ) ( 2.29 ) ( 2.29 )
EU economic flows 7.22 7.22 26.73*
( 15.04 ) ( 15.04 ) ( 16.67 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Tax -0.168 -0.168 -0.205
( 0.155 ) ( 0.155 ) ( 0.154 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Allowancest−1 -0.001 -0.001
( 0.001 ) ( 0.002 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Allowancest−1 × -0.032**
EU economic flows ( 0.013 )
Intercept -6.23 -6.16 -5.98
( 8.01 ) ( 7.99 ) ( 7.84 )
σ 8.74*** 8.74*** 8.57***
( 0.48 ) ( 0.48 ) ( 0.47 )
N 163 163 163
Log-likelihood -584.8 -584.7 -581.7
χ2 838.9 840.2 879.3
Dependent variable is CO2 Tax Levels. The table reports linear M-Star coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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This result is illustrated in the two-dimensional plots in Figure 5. In the scenario of
countries with high economic integration (high levels of economic flows), the countries that feel
the geographic pressure of close countries with CO2 allowances are likely to have high carbon
taxes, like in the case of Norway. The effects decrease and fade away as these countries become
more insular, as in the case of Iceland. The opposite is true for less economically integrated
countries (low levels of economic flows). Here the countries that are closer to countries with
CO2 allowances are more likely to have low carbon taxes (and, in the logic of complementarity,
carbon allowances), like in the case of Slovenia. Vice versa, being weakly linked through space
with CO2 allowances makes it more likely that these countries will raise carbon taxes, ceteris
paribus. Again, this is in line with our logic, as less economically integrated states choose
differently than their close neighbors, especially if these have implemented sophisticated policies
and if the alternative creates domestically beneficial opportunities, like attracting foreign firms
or subsidizing domestic businesses.36
Note that our results are robust to running an OLS spatial lag model and to not row-
standardizing the geographyW connectivity matrix (see Appendix). We also ran the same type
of 3SLS models described in the previous section, and find that there is a negative and significant
link between carbon taxes and the spatial lag of carbon allowances interacted with economic
flows. We find the same type of relationship for the allowances equation where the interaction
between the spatial lag of carbon taxes and economic flows is also negative and statistically
significant. This finding bolsters our conclusion that the geographic diffusion of climate change
mitigation is driven by the domestic and international considerations behind both policies.
Finally, one may wonder whether other variables that affect key actors’ preferences towards
different policies may interact with the spatial lag of the alternative policies. Our data seem
to suggest that this could be an alternative hypothesis to study within our general argument:
for example, we find that the spatial lag of carbon allowances differently affects countries
with left and right government ideology. Future work may expand our theory to explore
these additional patterns that explain how countries accept alternative diffusing policies when
36This was the case of many Eastern European countries investing in cap-and-trade. See http://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2012/nov/20/europe-emissions-trading.
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Figure 5: Effects of Economic Flows and Spatially Lagged Carbon Allowances on Carbon Taxes.
This figure is based on Model 3 from Table 3. The upper plots illustrate the marginal effects
(solid line) and the 90% confidence interval (dashed line) of the spatial clustering of carbon
allowances on the level of carbon taxes conditional on international economic flows. The his-
tograms show the spatially lagged carbon allowances of countries above and below the mean
value of the economic flows distribution.
domestic considerations, other than the political constraints linked to economic integration,
are imminent and salient.
Conclusion
Most analyses of policy diffusion operate under the assumption that international policy in-
terdependence can be observed by focusing on the diffusion of one policy across jurisdictions.
Yet, policy diffusion does not need to entail only one policy instrument, as governments of-
ten draw from several policies that may be diffusing simultaneously. This implies that policy
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interdependence may link countries in complex ways, as recent contributions on the politics
of globalization and interdependence have indicated (Rudra, 2008; Oatley, 2011; Farrell and
Newman, 2014; Chaudoin et al., 2015). Following this line of research, in this article we posit
that national governments are sensitive to the geographic implementation of a bundle of dif-
fusing policies, and that these policies may substitute or complement each other. Furthermore,
we argue that the sensitivity to the spatial distribution of alternative policies is mediated by
whether a country is dependent on international economic flows and may cause what we call
policy alteration.
We test our argument with two empirical analyses that focus on environmental policies.
Our spatial econometrics models suggest that geographic distance to implementing countries
and domestic constraints based on the dependence on international capital flows generate in-
centives to adopt alternative policies. Specifically, we find that policy alteration is more likely
to occur in countries that are relatively less dependent on economic flows and where govern-
ments consequently enjoy more political leeway to shape processes of policy diffusion to their
strategic advantage. More generally, our findings suggest that by restricting the analysis on
only one focal policy, researchers risk underestimating the overall degree of international in-
terdependence. Thus, to avoid biased inference, it is important to integrate the logic of policy
alteration into diffusion analyses when alternative policies are identifiable and when govern-
ments can be expected to strategically choose from a set of policy instruments. Further work
may build on our framework and test its validity by replicating our study in another policy
field, exploring the interaction of alternative policies with other key domestic factors such as
industrial lobbying and pressure from various societal groups, and using new techniques that
allow the estimation of spatial models for endogenous policies.
Finally, beyond opening a dialogue with the literature on policy diffusion and environmen-
tal politics, our study speaks to more general debates in the field of international relations. We
provided evidence for how domestic decision makers learn from and react to the policies enacted
in foreign countries. Therefore, our study may be useful to discuss hurdles of globalization in
different domestic contexts, adding on to the embedded liberalism hypothesis. Moreover, our
analysis supports the varieties of capitalism literature in pointing that government decisions
38
in such diverse areas as foreign policy and diplomacy, foreign aid and immigration imply that
governments have to weigh and choose among different policy instruments, taking into account
both domestic and international constraints.
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The robustness checks discussed in the article are illustrated in the following tables and figures:
• Figure A.1 illustrates the relation between alternative policies in a context of diffusion.
• Table A.1 – A.7 refer to additional analyses for our first empirical study (Case 1).
– Table A.1 reports the results from an OLS model of green tax
– Table A.2 is an OLS model of green tax with aWgeographic distance*Green subsidy
t−1 matrix that is not row-standardized.
– Table A.3 reports additional M-STAR results controlling for EU membership.
– Table A.4 reports the results from the 3SLS estimations of the two structural equa-
tions for Green tax and Green subsidies.
– Table A.5 reports the results from the 3SLS estimations of two structural equations
for Green tax and Green subsidies where GDP is calculated in absolute terms.
– Table A.6 reports the results from M-Star and OLS models where the connectivity
matrices are calculated across all distances, respectively.
– Table A.7 reports the 3SLS estimations of two structural equations for Green tax and
Green subsidies where the connectivity matrices are calculated across all distances.
• Figure A.2 – A.4 illustrate the interaction effects for our first empirical study (Case 1).
– Figure A.2 refers to the interaction reported in Table 1.
– Figure A.3 and Figure A.4 refer to the interactions reported in Table A.6.
• Figure A.5 and Figure A.6 map the sample and the two carbon policies of the second
empirical study (Case 2).
• Table A.8 – A.10 report the results from robustness tests for our second empirical study
(Case 2).
– Table A.8 reports the results from an OLS model of carbon tax
– Table A.9 reports the 3SLS estimations of two structural equations for carbon tax
and carbon allowances
– Table A.10 reports the results from the M-Star model whereWgeographic distance*
Carbon allowances t−1 is interacted with the Left-right ideology measure.
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Figure A.1: Effects of Different Types of Alternative Policies: The figure shows the relation
between two ideal alternative policies x and y that are substitutable by degree. Decision-
makers may adopt a level of policy x and a level of policy y, while still keeping with the idea of
substitution according to which governments may adopt more x compared to y (or vice versa).
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Table A.1: Green Taxes and Green Subsidies in OECD countries: The Effect of Alternative
Policy Levels
OLS models of Green Tax
(1) (2) (3)
Green taxt−1 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.89***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Green subsidyt−1 -0.173 -0.226 -0.226
(0.170) (0.170) (0.170)
Energy production -9829.4 -9463.5 -1604.8
(19608.6) (19500.4) (19955.1)
GDP per capita -0.0051* -0.0046 -0.0041
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
GDP per capita sq. 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Unemployment 4.58 1.70 3.33
(5.00) (5.21) (5.27)
Unemployment sq. -0.34 -0.22 -0.27
(0.23) (0.24) (0.24)
Income tax per capita 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Left-right position -1.40*** -1.44*** -1.41***
(0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
Environmental position 0.064 -4.11 -2.75
(8.83) (8.96) (8.95)
Environmental position sq. -0.72 -0.26 -0.35
(0.85) (0.87) (0.86)
Green party -3.98 -4.95 -5.00
(12.6) (12.5) (12.5)
Actual economic flows -0.085 -0.12 -0.65
(0.40) (0.40) (0.51)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax -0.048 -0.008 -0.008
(0.089) (0.090) (0.090)
ρ: WIGOs*Green tax 0.41*** 0.37*** 0.34***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
ρ: Wdyadic trade*Green tax 0.15 0.16* 0.18*
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 0.071* -0.017
(0.035) (0.15)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 × 0.003*
Actual economic flows (0.001)
Intercept -272.5*** -266.9*** -240.8***
(74.1) (73.8) (75.0)
N 231 231 231
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96
Dependent variable is Green Tax Levels. The table reports linear OLS coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3
Table A.2: Green Taxes and Green Subsidies in OECD countries: Unstandardized Green Sub-
sidy Spatial Matrix
OLS models of Green Tax
(1) (2) (3)
Green taxt−1 0.404*** 0.406*** 0.407***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Green subsidyt−1 -0.00141 -0.00143 -0.000166
(0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0019)
Energy production -177898.5* -197374.5** -165970.1*
(92133.3) (95125.7) (96295.9)
GDP per capita -0.0194* -0.0260* -0.0221
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
GDP per capita sq. 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Unemployment 24.94*** 24.98*** 27.28***
(7.39) (7.43) (7.52)
Unemployment sq. -0.915*** -0.919*** -1.012***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27)
Income tax per capita 0.917*** 0.898*** 0.950***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Left-right position -0.789 -0.796 -0.817
(0.51) (0.51) (0.51)
Environmental position 14.31* 14.21* 15.42**
(7.42) (7.45) (7.45)
Environmental position sq. -1.845** -1.830** -1.932***
(0.74) (0.74) (0.74)
Green party 21.82* 21.18* 20.19
(12.3) (12.4) (12.3)
Actual economic flows -2.106*** -2.027*** -2.673***
(0.76) (0.77) (0.86)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax -0.653*** -0.666*** -0.630***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
ρ: WIGOs*Green tax 0.589*** 0.586*** 0.562***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
ρ: Wdyadic trade*Green tax 0.307* 0.321* 0.309*
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 0.00000038 -0.00000481
(0.00000031) (0.0000029)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 × 0.00000053*
Actual economic flows (0.00000032)
Intercept -227.0 -159.8 -216.4
(215.2) (227.8) (229.3)
σ
N 231 231 231
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.98
Log-likelihood -1199.7 -1189.5 -1187.8
Dependent variable is Green Tax Levels. The table reports linear OLS coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Fixed
effects included.
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Table A.3: Green Taxes and Green Subsidies in OECD countries: The Effect of Alternative
Policy Levels (Controlling for EU Membership)
M-Star models of Green Tax
(1) (2) (3)
Green taxt−1 0.89*** 0.86*** 0.89***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027)
Green subsidyt−1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Energy production -11091 7581 25042
(26576) (27227) (27393)
GDP per capita -0.006** -0.002 -0.006*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
GDP per capita sq. 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment 1.80 2.06 1.03
(5.40) (5.59) (5.41)
Unemployment sq. -0.24 -0.19 -0.19
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23)
Income tax per capita 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.20***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.046)
Left-right position -1.26*** -1.58*** -1.20***
(0.45) (0.45) (0.44)
Environmental position 0.07 -8.21 -1.42
(8.47) (8.66) (8.49)
Environmental position sq. -0.66 0.20 -0.41
(0.81) (0.83) (0.82)
Green party -0.83 -4.37 2.53
(12.3) (12.6) (12.3)
EU membership 21.7 18.2 26.3
(18.9) (19.5) (19.2)
Actual economic flows -0.22 0.14 -0.91
(0.39) (0.38) (0.50)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax -0.049 0.163* 0.001
(0.086) (0.074) (0.087)
ρ: WIGOs*Green tax 0.43*** 0.006** 0.36***
(0.10) (0.003) (0.10)
ρ: Wdyadic trade*Green tax 0.10 0.37*** 0.15*
(0.088) (0.062) (0.089)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 -0.16 -0.13
(0.11) (0.11)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 × 0.003*
Actual economic flows (0.001)
Intercept -218.0*** -305.0*** -201.1***
(68.5) (68.6) (70.9)
σ 66.8*** 68.5*** 65.9***
(3.11) (3.17) (3.05)
N 233 233 233
Log-likelihood -1311.6 -1316.9 -1307.9
χ2 5926.5 5680.1 6138.9
Dependent variable is Green Tax Levels. The table reports linear M-Star coefficients.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Green Taxes and Green Subsidies in OECD countries: 3SLS Models
Tax Subsidy Tax Subsidy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Green taxt−1 0.964*** 0.564 0.973*** 0.533
( 0.025 ) ( 1.100 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 1.161 )
Green subsidyt−1 -0.003 0.551*** -0.010 0.565***
( 0.005 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.061 )
Income tax per capita 0.092 -0.013 0.112** -1.139
( 0.056 ) ( 1.586 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 1.741 )
Left-right position -1.288*** -1.861 -1.561** 24.418
( 0.489 ) ( 16.139 ) ( 0.676 ) ( 22.531 )
Environmental position -0.118 -470.580 -29.543* -169.430
( 8.876 ) ( 300.0 ) ( 16.562 ) ( 500.312 )
Environmental position sq. -0.741 30.6 1.670 15.8
( 0.845 ) ( 29.844 ) ( 1.537 ) ( 48.617 )
Green party 2.905 -4.023 -8.668 175.563
( 12.204 ) ( 39.767 ) ( 17.337 ) ( 515.771 )
Actual economic flows 0.199 -22.848* -0.419 -27.756
( 0.485 ) ( 13.339 ) ( 0.807 ) ( 20.441 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Y 0.023 -0.035 -0.103 -0.063**
( 0.096 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.129 ) ( 0.031 )
ρ: WIGOs*Y 0.427*** 0.126*** 0.523*** 0.146 ***
( 0.103 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.126 ) ( 0.038 )
ρ: Wdyadic trade*Y 0.073 -0.036** 0.128 -0.038**
( 0.078 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.018 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 0.011 -0.721**
( 0.053 ) ( 0.338 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 × 0.009**
Actual economic flows ( 0.004 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax t−1 0.648 0.154
( 1.170 ) ( 3.503 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax t−1 × 0.006
Actual economic flows ( 0.042 )
Intercept -328.889*** 2053.667 -225.968** 1713.840
( 72.577 ) ( 1318.059 ) ( 104.722 ) ( 1680.600 )
N 231 231 231 231
R-squared 0.96 0.36 0.96 0.36
The table reports the coefficients for 3SLS linear models. The dependent variables for each set of equations are
Level of Green Tax and Level of Green Subsidy, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. The endogenous
variables are GPD per, capita, GDP per capita squared, Unemployment, Unemployment squared, and Energy
Production (fixed effects included). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A.2: Effects of Spatial Clustering of Subsidies on the Level of Green Taxes Conditional
on Level of International Economic Integration. This figure is based on the interaction of Model
3 in Table 1.
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Table A.5: Green Taxes and Green Subsidies in OECD countries: 3SLS Models with Subsidy
per Absolute GDP
Tax Subsidy Tax Subsidy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Green taxt−1 0.950*** 0.002*** 0.945*** 0.003***
( 0.025 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.001 )
Green subsidyt−1 0.776 0.235*** 0.840 0.205***
( 5.313 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 6.515 ) ( 0.067 )
Income tax per capita 0.099** 0.000 0.133** -0.001
( 0.049 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.001 )
Left-right position -1.256*** 0.005 -1.799*** 0.016
( 0.477 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.674 ) ( 0.013 )
Environmental position 3.223 0.170 -14.313 -0.158
( 8.839 ) ( 300.005 ) ( 14.751 ) ( 0.281 )
Environmental position sq. -0.949 0.022 0.463 0.029
( 0.870 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 1.485 ) ( 0.027 )
Green party 2.407 0.379* -23.761 0.623
( 12.415 ) ( 0.228 ) ( 18.741 ) ( 0.297 )
Actual economic flows 0.092 0.006 0.327 0.014
( 0.428 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.514 ) ( 0.012 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Y 0.029 -0.035 -0.025 0.000
( 0.094 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.000 )
ρ: WIGOs*Y 0.458*** 0.126*** 0.428*** 0.000**
( 0.102 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.106 ) ( 0.000 )
ρ: Wdyadic trade*Y 0.074 -0.036** 0.173* 0.000
( 0.082 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.000 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 0.067* -0.716*
( 0.040 ) ( 0.411 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 × 0.009*
Actual economic flows ( 0.005 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax t−1 -0.003*** 0.154
( 0.001 ) ( 3.503 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax t−1 × 0.000
Actual economic flows ( 0.000 )
Intercept -357.409*** -0.411 -344.616** -0.690
( 68.036 ) ( 0.872 ) ( 73.946 ) ( 0.967 )
N 231 231 231 231
R-squared 0.96 0.28 0.96 0.28
The table reports coefficients for 3SLS linear models. The dependent variables for each set of equations
are Level of Green Tax and Level of Green Subsidy by absolute GDP. Standard errors in parentheses.
The endogenous variables are GPD per capita, GDP per capita sq., Unemployment, Unemployment
sq., Energy Production (fixed effects included). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Green Taxes and Green Subsidies in OECD countries: The Effect of Alternative
Policy Levels Across All Distances
OLS models of Green Tax M-Star models of Green Tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Green taxt−1 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41** 0.41*** 0.41***
( 0.046 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.041 )
Green subsidyt−1 -1.197 -1.104 -0.978 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009
( 1.387 ) ( 1.401 ) ( 1.390 ) ( -0.012 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.012 )
Energy production -198671** -202924** -227340** -177734** -184954** -210051**
( 94571 ) ( 95125 ) ( 95000 ) ( -83309 ) ( 83543 ) ( 83273 )
GDP per capita -0.026* -0.027** -0.026* -0.020* -0.021** -0.021**
( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.01 )
GDP per capita sq. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
Unemployment 24.9*** 24.6*** 23.3*** 25.4*** 24.8*** 23.6***
( 7.41 ) ( 7.45 ) ( 7.41 ) ( 6.68 ) ( 6.70 ) ( 6.64 )
Unemployment sq. -0.918*** -0.908*** -0.866*** -0.94*** -0.92*** -0.88***
( 0.262 ) ( 0.263 ) ( 0.261 ) ( 0.24 ) ( 0.24 ) ( 0.23 )
Income tax per capita 0.897*** 0.898*** 0.880*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.93***
( 0.121 ) ( 0.121 ) ( 0.120 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.11 )
Left-right position -0.792 -0.794 -0.819 -0.84* -0.84* -0.87*
( 0.508 ) ( 0.510 ) ( 0.505 ) ( 0.46 ) ( 0.46 ) ( 0.45 )
Environmental position 14.24* 14.62* 15.06** 14.9** 15.5** 15.8**
( 7.44 ) ( 7.49 ) ( 7.43 ) ( 6.71 ) ( 6.73 ) ( 6.66 )
Environmental position sq. -1.828** -1.848* -1.877** -1.90*** -1.92*** -1.94***
( 0.741 ) ( 0.744 ) ( 0.737 ) ( 0.67 ) ( 0.67 ) ( 0.66 )
Green party 21.24* 20.81* 17.55 22.7** 21.9** 18.6*
( 12.31 ) ( 12.37 ) ( 12.35 ) ( 11.1 ) ( 11.1 ) ( 11.1 )
Actual economic flows -2.022*** -2.001** -0.650 -2.18*** -2.14*** -0.79
( 0.769 ) ( 0.772 ) ( 1.001 ) ( 0.69 ) ( 0.69 ) ( 0.89 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax -0.666*** -0.636*** -0.609*** -0.584*** -0.539*** -0.518***
( 0.164 ) ( 0.175 ) ( 0.174 ) ( 0.134 ) ( 0.142 ) ( 0.141 )
ρ: WIGOs*Green tax 0.588*** 0.559*** 0.506*** 0.612*** 0.562*** 0.510***
( 0.181 ) ( 0.190 ) ( 0.190 ) ( 0.157 ) ( 0.164 ) ( 0.164 )
ρ: Wdyadic trade*Green tax 0.318* 0.307* 0.322* 0.186 0.178 0.197
( 0.164 ) ( 0.166 ) ( 0.165 ) ( 0.133 ) ( 0.134 ) ( 0.133 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 -0.003 0.004* -0.053 0.378**
( 0.006 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.052 ) ( 0.189 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 × -0.002** -0.006**
Actual economic flows ( 0.001 ) ( -0.003 )
Intercept -155.74 -135.07 -206.05 -204 -170.3 -237.1
( 226.73 ) ( 230.76 ) ( 231.22 ) ( 191.9 ) ( 194.7 ) ( 194.6 )
σ 41.7*** 41.7*** 41.3***
( 1.94 ) ( 1.94 ) ( 1.92 )
N 231 231 231 231 231 231
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.98
Log-likelihood -1202.3 -1201.8 -1199.1
χ2 15602.3 15627.9 15997.6
This table reports coefficients from linear models where the spatial lag is calculated across all distances (see text for more
details). Dependent variable is Green Tax Levels. Models 1-3 report coefficients from an OLS specification, while Models
4-6 report coefficients from a multiparametric spatiotemporal autoregressive (M-Star) specification. Standard errors in
parentheses. Fixed effects not reported for brevity. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Green Taxes and Green Subsidies in OECD countries: 3SLS Models of Alternative
Policies Across All Distances
Tax Subsidy Tax Subsidy Tax Subsidy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Green taxt−1 1.00*** 0.001 0.99*** 0.001 0.99*** 0.001
( 0.026 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.030 ) ( 0.001 )
Green subsidyt−1 -4.17 1.00*** -6.11* 1.00*** -6.84* 1.00***
( 2.936 ) ( 0.111 ) ( 3.309 ) ( 0.113 ) ( 3.511 ) ( 0.115 )
Income tax per capita 0.072 -0.001 0.092 0.000 0.090 -0.001
( 0.050 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.002 )
Left-right position -1.244** 0.002 -0.820 0.001 -0.983* 0.001
( 0.480 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.544 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.579 ) ( 0.019 )
Environmental position -3.047 -0.167 3.663 -0.171 2.162 -0.182
( 8.836 ) ( 0.329 ) ( 9.985 ) ( 0.329 ) ( 10.573 ) ( 0.332 )
Environmental position sq. -0.571 0.012 -0.491 0.012 -0.379 0.012
( 0.843 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.943 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.998 ) ( 0.032 )
Green party 1.082 -0.006 -4.068 -0.024 -11.976 0.006
( 12.253 ) ( 0.457 ) ( 13.75 ) ( 0.463 ) ( 14.92 ) ( 0.469 )
Actual economic flows 0.123 0.002 -0.003 0.001 10.30** -0.096
( 0.449 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.502 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 4.408 ) ( 0.117 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Y 0.045 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.002 0.000
( 0.096 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.108 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.124 ) ( 0.000 )
ρ: WIGOs*Y 0.454*** 0.001*** 0.065 0.0001*** 0.082 0.0001***
( 0.104 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.139 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.147 ) ( 0.000 )
ρ: Wdyadic trade*Y 0.036 -0.0004* -0.051 -0.0004* -0.028 -0.0004*
( 0.079 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.0002 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 -0.010*** 0.027*
( 0.002 ) ( 0.016 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green subsidy t−1 × -0.0005**
Actual economic flows ( 0.0002 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax t−1 -0.001 -0.014
( 0.005 ) ( 0.016 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Green tax t−1 × 0.0002
Actual economic flows ( 0.0002 )
Intercept -334.6*** -2.3 159.3 -1.7 -623.0* 5.3
( 70.4 ) ( 1.6 ) ( 125.2 ) ( 3.5 ) ( 358.1 ) ( 9.0 )
N 233 233 233 233 233 233
R-squared 0.96 0.16 0.96 0.16 0.96 0.16
The table reports 3SLS linear coefficients. The dependent variables for each set of equations are Level of Green Tax
and Level of Green Subsidy. Standard errors are in parentheses. The endogenous variables are GPD per capita,
GDP per capita squared, Unemployment, Unemployment squared, and Energy Production (fixed effects included).
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure A.3: Effects of Spatial Clustering of Subsidies on Green Taxes Conditional on Interna-
tional Economic Flows. This figure is based on the interaction of Model 3 in Table A.6. The
spatial lag for green subsidies is calculated across all distances.
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Figure A.4: Effects of Spatial Clustering of Subsidies on Green Taxes Conditional on Interna-
tional Economic Flows. This figure is based on the interaction of Model 6 in Table A.6. The
spatial lag for green subsidies is calculated across all distances.
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Table A.8: Carbon Taxes in the Greater European Area and The Conditional Spatial Effect of
Carbon Allowances
OLS models of CO2 Tax
(1) (2) (3)
CO2 Taxt−1 0.751*** 0.755*** 0.761***
( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.055 )
CO2 Allowancest−1 0.0007* 0.0006 0.0006
( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0004 )
Energy production -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 )
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
GDP per capita sq. -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
CO2 per capita 2.93* 2.98* 3.57*
( 1.75 ) ( 1.75 ) ( 1.73 )
CO2 per capita sq. -0.139 -0.142 -0.168*
( 0.088 ) ( 0.087 ) ( 0.087 )
Government Effectiveness -6.87* -6.75* -7.42**
( 3.60 ) ( 3.59 ) ( 3.54 )
Left-right position -0.656 -0.648 -0.875
( 0.938 ) ( 0.935 ) ( 0.924 )
EU integration 9.31*** 8.87*** 10.66***
( 2.44 ) ( 2.46 ) ( 2.52 )
EU economic flows 6.61 6.89 28.12
( 15.73 ) ( 15.69 ) ( 17.63 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Tax -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
( 0.001 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Allowancest−1 -0.003 -0.004*
( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Allowancest−1 × -0.037**
EU economic flows ( 0.015 )
Intercept -6.01 -6.87 -7.87
( 8.35 ) ( 8.35 ) ( 8.21 )
N 163 163 163
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.85
Dependent variable is CO2 Tax Levels. The table reports linear (OLS) coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: CO2 Tax and CO2 Allowances in Europe: 3SLS Models
Tax Allowances Tax Allowances Tax Allowances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CO2 Taxt−1 0.604*** 23.125 0.632*** 31.54* 0.693*** 25.08
( 0.094 ) ( 16.96 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 17.26 ) ( 0.1042) ( 17.66 )
CO2 Allowancest−1 0.002** 0.440*** 0.002 0.400*** 0.001 0.407***
( 0.001 ) ( 0.103 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.104 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.105 )
Energy production -0.001* 0.004 -0.0001 0.008 0.000 0.013*
( 0.000 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.007 )
GDP per capita 0.000 0.007 0.0003 0.052 -0.0001 -0.004
( 0.000 ) ( 0.051 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.066 )
GDP per capita sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
CO2 per capita 2.934 561.0 3.09 489.00 4.882** 713.5*
( 1.91 ) ( 352.4 ) ( 2.07 ) ( 352.07 ) ( 2.02) ( 368.2 )
CO2 per capita sq. -0.144 -24.7 -0.1517 -21.11 -0.228** -31.2*
( 0.095 ) ( 17.7 ) ( 0.103 ) ( 17.63 ) ( 0.099 ) ( 18.3 )
Government effectiveness -5.675 -799.9 -5.513 -1406.5* -8.312** -1479.5*
( 3.954 ) ( 652.2 ) ( 4.286 ) ( 793.6 ) ( 4.093 ) ( 798.7 )
Left-right position -1.40 74.5 -1.31 142.8 -1.68 57.4
( 1.116 ) ( 189.9 ) ( 1.2088 ) ( 193.4 ) ( 1.1240 ) ( 198.5 )
EU integration 10.14*** 724.9 8.42** 1112.0* 14.67*** 1993.2***
( 2.647 ) ( 476.2 ) ( 3.7934 ) ( 581.5 ) ( 4.1003 ) ( 703.5 )
EU economic flows 6.574 -1472.1 7.30 -2340.9 70.50** 6909.4
( 17.081 ) ( 3120.9 ) ( 18.40 ) ( 3167.0 ) ( 27.25 ) ( 5199.6 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*Y -0.001 -0.165 0.005 0.361 -0.001 0.470
( 0.002 ) ( 0.352 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.550 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.554 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Allowancest−1 -0.013 -0.007
( 0.017 ) 0.016
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Taxt−1 -0.007 -0.012**
( 0.005) ( 0.006 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Allowancest−1 × -0.112***
EU economic flows ( 0.038 )
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Taxt−1 × -0.070**
EU economic flows ( 0.031 )
Intercept -4.6320 -2515.9 -7.9583 -1950.1 -10.1 -2280.9
( 9.2672 ) ( 1658.9 ) ( 11.2247 ) ( 1691.4 ) ( 10.4 ) ( 1708.2 )
N 163 163 163 163 163 163
R-squared 0.83 0.48 0.81 0.49 0.82 0.48
The table reports 3SLS linear coefficients. The dependent variables for each set of equations are Level of Green Tax and
Level of Carbon Allowance, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The endogenous variables are GPD per
capita, GDP per capita squared, CO2 per capita, CO2 per capita, Energy production and Government effectiveness.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.10: CO2 Tax and CO2 Allowances in Europe: The effect of government ideology
M-Star model of CO2 Tax
CO2 Taxt−1 0.75***
(0.053)
CO2 Allowancest−1 0.0007*
(0.0004)
Energy production -0.000
(0.000)
GDP per capita 0.0002
(0.0002)
GDP per capita sq. 0.000
(0.000)
CO2 per capita 2.72
(1.67)
CO2 per capita sq. -0.13
(0.083)
Government Effectiveness -5.97*
(3.35)
Left-right position -1.98*
(1.16)
EU Integration 8.64***
(2.28)
EU economic flows 11.1
(15.1)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Tax -0.12
(0.16)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Allowancest−1 -0.006*
(0.004)
ρ: Wgeographic distance*CO2 Allowancest−1 × 0.003*
Left-right position (0.001)
Intercept -2.49
(8.17)
σ 8.65***
(0.48)
N 163
Log-likelihood -583.2
χ2 859.6
This table reports coefficients from a linear multiparametric spatiotemporal
autoregressive (M-Star)specification. Dependent variable is CO2 Tax Levels.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
17
